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A QUICK REFRESHER COURSE IN MACROECONOMICS
ABSTRACT
This paper presents a non-technical discussion of some of
the important developments in macroeconomics over the past twenty
years.It considers three broad catagories of research. First,
it discusses how the notion of rational expectations has affected
economists' views on the role of economic policy, the debate over
rules versus discretion, and empirical work in macroeconomics
Second, it discusses various new classical approaches to the
business cycle, including imperfect information theories, real
business cycle theories, and sectoral shift theories. Third, it
discusses various new Keynesian approaches to the business cycle,
includes theories based on general disequilibrium, labor






Twenty years ago, it was easier being a student of
macroeconomics. Macroeconomists felt more sure of the answers
they gave to questions such as, "What causes output and
employment to fluctuate?" and "How should policy respond to these
fluctuations?"
At the textbook level, the accepted model of the economy•]S
the IS—LM model. It was little changed from John Hicks's (1937)
interpretation of John Maynard Keynes's (1936) once revolutionary
vision of the economy. Because the IS—LM model took the price
level as given, a PLlips curve of some sort was appended to
explain the adjustment of prices. Some thought the Phillips
curve had the natural rate property, implying that the economy
was self—correcting in the long run.
At the more applied level, this consensus was embodied in
the large—scale macroeconometric models, such as the MITPenn
Social Science Research Council (MPS) model. The job of refining
these models generated many dissertations. Private and public
decision—makers confidently used the models to forecast important
economic time series and to evaluate the effects of alternative
macroeconomic policies.
Today, macroeconomists are much less sure of their answers.
The IS—LM model rarely finds its way into scholarly journals;
some economists view the model as a relic of a bygone age and no
longer bother to teach it. The large—scale macroeconOmetric
1models are mentioned only occasionally at academic conferences,
often with derision. A graduate student today is unlikely to
devote his dissertation to improving some small sector of the MPS
model.
In contrast to this radical change in the way academic
macroeconomists view their field of study, applied
macroeconomists have not substantially changed the way they
analyze the economy. The IS—LM model, augmented by the Phillips
curve, continues to provide the best way to interpret discussions
of economic policy in the press and among policy—makers.
Economists in business and government continue to use the large—
scale macroeconometric models for forecasting and policy
analysis. The theoretical developments of the past twentyyears
have had relatively little impact on applied macroeconomics.
Why is there such a great disparity between academic and
applied macroeconomics? The view of some academics is that
practitioners have simply fallen behind the state of theart,
that they continue to use obsolete models becausethey have not
kept up with the quickly advancing field. Yet thisself—serving
view is suspect, for it violates a fundamentalproperty of
economic equilibrium: it assumes a profitopportunity remains
unexploited. If recent developments in macroeconomics were
useful for applied work, they should have beenadopted. The
observation that recent developments have had littleimpact on
applied macroeconomics creates at least thepresumption that
these developments are of little use toapplied macroeconomists.
2One might be tempted to conclude that, because the
macroeconomic research of the past twenty years has had little
impact on applied economists, the research has no value. Yet
this conclusion also is unwarranted. The past twenty years have
been a fertile time for macroeconomics. Recent developments have
just not been of the sort that can be quickly adopted by applied
economists.
A Parable for Macroeconomics
A tale from the history of science is helpful for
understanding the current state of macroeconomics. Because I am
not an historian of science, I cannot vouch for its accuracy.
But regardless of whether it is true in detail, the story serves
nicely as a parable for macroeconomics today.
Approximately five centuries ago, Nicholas Copernicus
suggested that the sun, rather than the earth, is the center of
the planetary system. At the time, he mistakenly thought that
the planets followed circular orbits; we now know that these
orbits are actually elliptical. Compared to the then prevailing
geocentric system of Ptolemy, the original Copernican system was
more elegant and, ultimately, it proved more useful. But at the
time it was proposed and for many years thereafter, the
Copernican system did not work as well as the Ptolemaic system.
For predicting the positions of the planets, the Ptolemaic system
was superior.
Now imagine yourself, alternatively, as an academic
3astronomer and as an applied astronomer when Copernicus first
published. If you had been an academic astronomer, you would
have devoted your research to improving the Copernican system.
The Copernican system held out the greater promise for
understanding the movements of the planets in a simple and
intellectually satisfying way.
Yet if you had been an applied astronomer, you would have
continued to use the Ptolemaic system.It would have been
foolhardy to navigate your ship by the more promising yet less
accurate Copernican system. Given the state of knowledge
immediately after Copernicus, a functional separation between
academic and applied astronomers was reasonable and, indeed,
optimal.
In this paper I survey some of the recent developments in
macroeconomics.My intended audience includes those applied
economists in business and government who often view recent
research with a combination of amusement, puzzlement, and
disdain. My goal is not to proselytize. Rather, it is to show
how several recent developments point the way toward a better
understanding of the economy, just as Copernicus's suggestion of
the heliocentric system pointed the way toward a better
understanding of planetary motion. Yet just as Copernicus did
not see his vision fully realized in his lifetime, we should not
expect these recent developments, no matter how promising, to be
of great practical use in the near future. In the longrun,
however, many of these developments will profoundly change the
4way all economists think about the economy and economic policy.
The Breakdown of the Consensus
The consensus in macroeconomics that prevailed until the
early 1970s faltered because of two flaws, one empirical and one
theoretical. The empirical flaw was that the consensus view
could not adequately cope with the rising rates of inflation and
unemployment experienced during the 1970s. The theoretical flaw
was that the consensus view left a chasm between microeconomjc
principles and macroeconomic practice that was too great to be
intel lectually satis Lying.
These two flaw'- came together most dramatically and most
profoundly in the famous prediction of Milton Friedman (1968) and
Edmund Phelps (1968). According to the unadorned Phillips curve,
one could achieve and maintain a permanently low level of
unemployment merely by tolerating a permanently high level of
inflation. In the late 1960s, when the consensus view was still
in its heyday, Friedman and Phelps argued from microeconomic
principles that this empirical relationship between inflation and
unemployment would break down if policy—makers tried to exploit
it. They reasoned that the equilibrium, or natural, rate of
unemployment should depend on labor supply, labor demand, optimal
search times, and other microeconomic considerations, not on the
average rate of money growth. Subsequent events proved Friedman
and Phelps correct: inflation rose without a permanent reduction
in unemployment.
5The breakdown of the Phillips curve and the prescience of
Friedman and Phelps made macroeconomists ready for Robert Lucas's
(1976) more comprehensive attack on the consensus view. Lucas
contended that many of the empirical relations that make up the
large—scale macroeconometric models were no better founded on
microeconornic principles than was the Phillips curve.In
particular, the decisions that determine most macroeconomic
variables, such as consumption and investment, depend crucially
on expectations of the future course of the economy.
Macroeconometric models treated expectations in a cavalier way,
most often by resorting to plausible but arbitrary proxies.
Lucas pointed out that most policy interventions change the way
individuals form expectations about the future. Yet the proxies
for expectations used in the macroeconometric models failed to
take account of this change in expectation formation. Lucas
concluded, therefore, that these models should not be used to
evaluate the impact of alternative policies.
The "Lucas critique' became the rallying cry for those young
turks intent on destroying the consensus. Defenders of the
consensus argued that users of macroeconometric models were
already aware of the problem Lucas defined so forcefully, that
the models were nonetheless informative if used with care and
judgement, and that the Lucas critique was right in principle but
not important in practice. These defenses were not heeded.
As I have mentioned, the consensus in macroeconomics broke
down because of two flaws. Both were crucial. Neither the
6empirical flaw nor the theor'tical flaw was, by itself,
sufficient to cause the breakdown. As an exercise in
intellectual history, it is instructive to consider two
counterfactuals.
Suppose the macroeconometric models had failed to explain
the events of the 1970s, but macroeconomists had felt confident
in the theoretical underpinning of these models. Undoubtedly the
events could have been explained away. As defenders of the
consensus view often assert, much of the stagflationary l9lOs can
be attributed to the OPEC supply shocks. The remainder could
always have been attributed to a few large residuals.
Heteroskedasticity s never been a reason to throw out an
otherwise good model.
Alternatively, suppose the macroeconometric models had
performed wonderfully in the 1970s, but that Friedman, Phelps,
and Lucas had nevertheless spelled out their inadequate
microfoundations. In that case, the feeble foundations would
have disturbed only the theoretically obsessive. The prediction
of Friedman and Phelps would have been forgotten, even if it had
never been put to a test. The Lucas critique might have haunted
theoretical eccentrics, but the general response would have been,
"If it aint broke, donut fix it."
As it turned out, however, the macroeconometric models and
the consensus view did fail both empirically and theoretically.
This failure led to a period of confusion, division, and
excitement in macroeconomics which still continues today.
7Directions of Research
Much of the research in macroeconomics during the past
twenty years attempts to deal with the problems that caused the
breakdown of the consensus. Economists have focused renewed and
more intensive effort on building macroeconomics on a firm
microeconomic foundation. Very often, the relevance of the
research to current economic problems is sacrificed. To
macroeconomic practitioners, much of the research must seem
esoteric and useless. Indeed, for practical purposes, it is.
Let me divide recent developments in macroeconomics into
three catagories. Like most taxonomies of complex phenomena, the
one I propose is imperfect. Some developments fall into more
than one of the three catagories, and a few fallnaturally into
none of them. Yet the taxonomy is useful, for it helps in
understanding the motivation and goals of the researchprograms
undertaken by many academic macroeconocnjsts in recentyears.
One large category of research tries to modelexpectations
in a more satisfactory way than wascommon twenty years ago.
More careful attention to the treatment ofexpectations can often
extract new and surprising implications from standard models.
The widespread acceptance of the axiom of rationalexpectations
is perhaps the largest single change inmacroeconomics in the
past two decades.
A second category of researchattempts to explain
macroeconomic phenomena using new classical models. These models
8maintain the assumption that prices continually adjust to
equilibrate supply and demand. Twenty years ago, macroeconomjsts
commonly presumed that a non—market—clearing theory of some sort
was necessary to explain economic fluctuations. Recent research
has shown that market—clearing models have much richer
implications than was once thought and are not so easily
dismissed.
A third category of research attempts to reconstruct
macroeconomics using new Keynesian models. This last category is
the most compatible with the textbook model that combines the IS—
LM model with a modern Phillips curve. This research can be
viewed as attempting to put textbook Keynesian analysis on a
firmer microeconomic foundation.
EXPECTATIONS
The notion of rational expectations has its roots in John
Muths (1961) brilliant but long—neglected paper. Economists
routinely assume that firms rationally maximize profits, and that
consumers rationally maximize utility. It would be an act of
schizophrenia not to assume that economic agents act rationally
when they form their expectations of the future.
Much of the research in macroeconomics since the breakdown
of the consensus has explored the assumption of rational
expectations. By itself, the assumption of rational expectations
has no empirical implication, just as the assumption of utility
maximization has no direct empirical implication. Yet together
9with other auxiliary hypotheses, many of which predate the
introduction of rational expectations and at the time seemed
unobjectionable, the assumption of rational expectations can have
profound and startling implications.
Policy Irrelevance
One of the earliest and most controversial applications of
rational expectations was made by Thomas Sargent and Neil Wallace
(1975). They asserted that systematic monetary policy is
irrelevant to the path of output and employment. To reach this
conclusion, Sargent and Wallace merely applied rational
expectations to the expectations—augmented Phillips curve of
Friedman and Phelps. This Phillips curve posits that inflation
that is expected does not influence unemployment, but that
unexpected inflation temporarily lowers unemployment below its
natural rate. The assumption of rational expectations, however,
implies that people cannot be surprised by events that occur
systematically or by policies that are applied in a uniform and
consistent fashion. Sargent and Wallace reasoned that systematic
monetary policy can generate only inflation that is expected; it
cannot produce unexpected inflation and therefore cannot affect
unemployment. If correct as a description of the world, this
result would render ineffective policy rules such as "Increase
money growth when the economy looks like it is going into a
r e c e S S i 0 fl."
Much confusion once prevailed over the meaning of the
10Sargent—Wallace result. Policy irrelevance was sometimes said to
be the implication of rational expectations per Se.Wenow know
that rational expectations is not the issue at all. As Stanley
Fischer (1977) showed, it is entirely possible to construct
models with rational expectations in whichsystematic monetary
policy can stabilize the economy.Fischer's model, in which
sticky wages play a crucial role, produces Keynesian policy
prescriptions, despite the presence of rational expectations.
The Sargent—Wallace paper was important not because of its
substantive result of policy irrelevance, but because it helped
familiarize macroeconomists with the use of rational
expectations. It showed that models could be solved without
invoking arbitrary proxies for expectations, and that the
solution with rational expectations could look very different
from the more conventional solution. The paper by Sargent and
Wallace was one of the earliest applying rational expectations to
macroeconomic theory, and it illustrated vividly the potential
importance of that application.
Once the attention of macroeconomists turned L.a the central
role of expectations, many questions took on a new appearance.
Rethinking macroeconomic theory to take into account how private
decision—makers form expectations appropriate to their
environment became a major job for academic macroeconornists. It
replaced work on the large—scale macroeconometric models as the
primary focus of research.
11Rules versus Discretion
Of the many questions that have been reexamined, perhaps
the most important is whether public policy should be conducted
by rule or by discretion. Various authors have provided a new
and often persuasive reason to be skeptical about discretionary
policy when the outcome depends on the expectations of private
decision—makers (Finn Kydland and Edward Prescott 1977, Guillerrno
Calvo 1978, Fischer 1980, Robert Barro and David Gordon 1983).
The argument against discretion is illustrated most simply
in an example involving not economics but politics"specifically,
public policy about negotiating with terrorists over the release
of hostages. The announced policy of the United States and many
other nations is that we will not negotiate over hostages. Such
an announcement is intended to deter terrorists: if there is
nothing to be gained from kidnapping, rational terrorists won't
take hostages. But, in fact, terrorists are rational enough to
know that once hostages are taken, the announced policy may have
little force, and that the temptation to make some concession to
obtain the hostages' release may become overwhelming. The only
way to deter truly rational terrorists is somehow to take away
the discretion of policy—makers and commit them to a rule of
never negotiating. If policy—makers were truly unable to make
concessions, the inceitive for terrorists to take hostages would
be substantially reduced.
The same problem arises less dramatically in the conduct of
12monetary policy. Consider the dilemma of a monetary authority
concerned about both inflation and unemployment in a world
governed by the expectations—augmented Phillips curve of Friedman
and Phelps. The authority wants everyone to expect low
inflation, so that it will face a favorabl tradeoff between
inflation and unemployment. But an announcement of a policy of
low inflation is not credible. Once expectations are formed, the
authority has an incentive to renege on its announcement in order
to reduce unemployment. Private economic actors understand the
incentive to renege and therefore do not believe the announcement
in the first place. Just as a President facing a hostage crisis
is sorely tempted to negotiate their release, a monetary
authority with discretion is sorely tempted to inflate to reduce
unemployment. And just as terrorists discount announced policies
of never negotiating, private economic actors discount announced
policies of low inflation.
The surprising implication of this analysis is that policy—
makers can sometimes better achieve their own goals by having
their discretion taken away from them. In the case of hostages,
there will be fewer hostages taken and fewer hostages killed if
governments are bound to follow the seemingly harsh rule of
abandoning any hostages that are taken. In the case of monetary
policy, there will be lower inflation without higher unemployment
if the monetary authority is committed to a policy of zero
inflation.
This theory of monetary policy has a trivial but important
13corollary. Under one circumstance, a monetary authority wits
discretion achieves the same outcome as a monetary authority
bound to a fixed rule of zero inflation. If the authority
dislikes inflation much more than it dislikes unemployment,
inflation under discretion is near zero, since the monetary
authority has little incentive to inflate. This finding provides
some guidance to those whj have the job of appointing central
bankers. An alternative to imposing a fixed rule is to appoint
individuals with a fervent distaste for inflation.
The issue raised here in the context of hostages and
monetary policy is more generally called the time inconsistency
of optimal policy.It arises in many other contexts. For
example, the government may announce that it will not tax capital
in order to encourage accumulation; but once the capital is in
place, the government may be tempted to renege on its promise
because the taxation of existing capital is non—distortionary.
As another example, the government may announce that it will
prosecute all tax evaders vigorously; but once the taxes have
been evaded, the government may be tempted to declare a "tax
amnesty" to collect some extra revenue.As a third example, the
government may announce that it will give a temporary monopoly to
inventors of new products to encourage innovation; but once a
product has been invented, the government may be tempted to
revoke the patent to eliminate the distortion of monopoly
pricing. In each case, rational agents understand the incentive
for the government to renege, and this expectation affects their
14behavior. And in each case, the solution is to take away the
government's discretionary power by binding it to a fixed policy
rule.
Rational Expectations in Empirical Work
So far I have been emphasizing developments in macroeconomic
theory. But the widespread acceptance of rational expectations
as a methodological tenet has also had a profound influence on
empirical work. By focusing attention on how economic actors
should behave under uncertainty, the rational expectations
revolution has changeJ the way macroeconomists formulate their
theories and the way they use data to test them.
An example of a topic that has been extensively reexamined
in the light of rational expectations is the permanent income
theory of consumption. In a seminal paper, Robert Hall (1978)
pointed out a simple and surprising implication of the theory:.
changes in consumption should be unpredictable. According to the
permanent income theory, consumers facing an intertemporal budget
constraint try their best to smooth the path of their consumption
over time. As a result, consumption reflects consumers'
expectations about their future income; consumption changes only
when consumers revise these expectations. If consumers are using
all available information optimally, the revisions in their
expectations should be unpredictable, and so should changes in
their consumption. In essence, Hall applied the logic of the
efficient markets hypothesis, which economists have long used to
15explain the unpredictability of stock prices, to the permanent
income hypothesis.
Formulated in this way, the permanent income hypothesis is
easily tested. One merely regresses the change in consumption on
some set of lagged variables to see if these variables can
forecast changes in consumption. When Hall ran these
regressions, he found, to the surprise of many economists, that
the theory passed this test, at least as a first approximation.
Changes in aggregate consumption from quarter to quarter are
largely unpredictable. Like stock prices, consumption is close
to a random walk.
To see how revolutionary Hall's approach was, consider how
an empirical researcher gauges success. Twenty years ago,
empirical research on consumption most often entailed estimating
consumption functions. Success was measured by how well the
estimated equation fit the data; that is, success wasa high R2.
Hall turned this standard on its head, arguing that the permanent
income theory is valid precisely because he found a low R2. This
difference arises because Hall did not estimate a consumption
function, but instead examined the intertemporal first—order
condition of a representative consumer to check whether this
consumer was making systematic errors in optimization.
In retrospect, it- is clear that HalUs contribution was more
methodological than substantive. Hall concluded that the
evidence strongly favored the permanent income hypothesis.
Subsequent research, some of which has followed Hall's approach,
16has found that current income hasstronger influence on
consumption than the permanent income hypothesis predicts
(Marjorie Flavin 1981, Hall and Frederic Mishkin 1982, John
Campbell and Gregory Mankiw 1989, 1990, Chris Carroll and
Lawrence Summers 1989). There remains much controversy about the
validity of the permanent income hypothesis, but there is little
doubt that Hall changed forever the terms of the debate.
Once revolutionary, the rational expectations approach to
empirical work is now standard.It finds its most advanced
development in the Euler equation methods that evolved from
Hall's work on consumption. Researchers have applied these
methods to study labor supply, labor demand, spending on consumer
durables, business fixed investment, and inventory accumulation.
Although these new techniques are unlikely to replace old—
fashioned econometric approaches completely, they have earned a
permanent place in the empirical eConomist's- toolbox.
NEW CLASSICAL MACROECONOMICS
Because Lucas's initial attack on standard macroeconomic
practice emphasized the inadequate way expectations were treated,
the first task facing macroeconomists was to learn how to deal
with the foresight of rational economic agents. At the early
stages of the new classical revolution, some economists believed
that the macroeconometrjc models could be fixed relatively
easily.It seemed that the imperfect proxies for expectations
merely needed to be replaced by rational expectations. This
17view, it turned out,wastoo optimistic: there was much more work
to be done. The goal of the new classical revolution was to
rebuild macroeconomics beginning with microeconomic primitives of
preferences and technology. The new classical economists pursued
this goal while maintaining the axioms that individuals always
optimize and, more controversially, that markets always clear.
ImperfectInformation
Theearliest new classical models had the aim of generating
a monetary business cycle. To do this, they departed slightly
from the Walrasian paradigm by assuming imperfect information
regarding prices (Lucas 1972,1973). Individuals were assumed to
be more aware of the prices of the goods they produce than they
are of the prices of the goods they purchase. They therefore
tend to confuse movements in the overall price level (which
should not matter) with movements in relative prices (which
should matter). An unanticipated inflation leads individuals to
infer that the relative prices of the goods they produce are
temporarily high, which induces them to increase the quantity
supplied. This story thus implies that output depends on the
deviation of inflation from expected inflation. In this way, the
assumption of imperfect information was used to generate the
expectations—augmented Phillips curve of Friedman and Phelps.
Although this theory of the business cycle received much
attention in the 1970s, it has attracted few adherents in more
recent years. The reason for its decline in popularity is not
18clear. Critics ergue that confusion about the price level cannot
plausibly be so great as to generate the large changes in output
and employment observed over the business cycle. The empirical
evidence has also been generally unfavorable (Barro and Zvi
Hercowitz 1980, Nishkin 1983). But there is no completely
compelling evidence that explains why this approach has been so
widely abandoned.
Real Business Cycles
Those working in the new classical tradition have recently
been emphasizing "reals business cycle theory (John Long and
Charles Plosser 1983, Barro and Robert King 1984, Prescott 1986).
This theory proceeds from the assumption that there are large
random fluctuations in the rate of technological change. Because
these fluctuations in technology lead to fluctuations in relative
prices, individuals ratio-nally alter their labor supply and
consumption. The business cycle is, according to this theory,
the natural and efficient response of the economy to changes in
the available production technology.
The strengths of real business cycle models are that they
are highly parsimonious and, at the same time, rigorously founded
on microeconomic principles. They are often standard
intertemporal general equilibrium models, common in the study of
economic growth, amended only slightly to include random changes
in technology. These models mimic the behavior of important
economic time series surprisingly well. Edward Prescott
19provocatively concludes that the business cycleis not a puzzle;
rather, since economic fluctuations are anatural implication of
standard growth models, it would be a puzzleif we did not
observe business cycles.
Real business cycle theory contrasts sharply with the
consensus view of the l960s.I will mention briefly three
assumptions of these models that twenty years agowould have been
considered ridiculous and that today remain controversial.
First, real business cycle theory assumes that the economy
experiences large and sudden changes in theavailable production
technology. Many real business cycle models expLainrecessions
as periods of technological regress'that is,declines in
societys technological ability. Critics argue that large
changes in technology, and especially technological regress, are
implausible (Summers 1986, Mankiw 1989).It is a more common
presumption that technological progress occurs gradually.
Second, real business cycle theory assumes that fluctuations
in employment reflect changes in the amount people want to work.
Because employment fluctuates substantially while the
determinants of labor supply——the real wage and the real interest
rate——vary only slightly, these models require thatleisure be
highly substitutable over time. This assumption conflicts with
many econometric studies of labor supply using data on
individuals, which typically find small intertemporal
elasticities of substitution (Joseph Altonji 1986).It also
conflicts with the strong prior beliefs of many economists that
20high unemployment in recessions is largely involuntary.
Third, real business cycle theory assumes——and this is the
assumption from which the theory derives its name——that monetary
policy is irreLevant for economic fluctuations. Before real
business cycle theory entered the debate in the early 1980s,
almost all macroeconomists agreed on one proposition: money
matters. Although there was controversy about whether systematic
monetary policy could stabilize the economy, it was univeraUy
accepted that bad monetary policy could be destabilizing. •Real
business cycle theorists have challenged that view using the old
Keynesian argument that any correlation of money with output
arises because the money supply is endogenous (King and Plosser
1984). They also give little weight to anecdotal evidence on the
effects of monetary policy——like the Voicker disinflation of the
early 1980s——that seems to shape the views of many other
e c on o m.i St S
SectoralShifts
Another new classical approach to the business cycle is the
sectoral shift theory, which emphasizes the costly adjustment of
labor among sectors (David Lilien 1982, Fischer Black 1987).
Like real business cycle theory, the sectoral shift theory
observes the classical dichotomy by giving no role to monetary
disturbances. But unlike real business cycle theory, it departs
slightly from the Walrasian paradigm by assuming that when a
worker moves from one sector to another, a period of unemployment
21•is required, perhaps for job search. According to the sectoral
shift theory, recessiOns are periods during which there are more
sectoral shocks and thus a greater need for sectoral adjustment.
Although there is still much empirical work being done, the
weight of the available evidence appears not to support the
sectoral shift theory.If workers are unemployed voluntarily in
recessions because they are moving to new jobs in other sectors,
we would expect to find high unemployment coinciding with high
job vacancy. Yet observed fluctuations have just the opposite
pattern: high unemployment rates coincide with low levels of help
wanted advertising (Katharine Abraham and Lawrence Katz 1986).
Moreover, although the sectoral shift theory suggests that
workers are moving between sectors during recessions, the
opposite appears to be the case: the measured movement of workers
is strongly procyclical (Kevin Murphy and Robert Topel 1987).
These findings suggest that the sectoral shift theory is unlikely
to be plausibly reconciled with observed economic fluctuations.
Advocates of the sectoral shift theory argue that evidence
of this sort is not persuasive. It is possible that since the
process of sectoral adjustment requires a period of high
unemployment and low income, it lowers the demand for the
products of all sectors. Thus, we might observe low vacancies
and low movement during recessions, even if recessions are
initially caused by the need to reallocate labor among sectors.
In this form, it is not clear how to distinguish empirically the
sectoral shift theory from real business cycle theories that
22emphasize economy—wide fluctuations in technology or Keynesian
theories that emphasize fluctuations in aggregate demand.
NEW KEYNESIAN MACROECONOMICS
At the same time that many macroeconomists have been
attempting to explain economic fluctuations within the Wairasian
paradigm, many other macroeconomists have been working within the
non—Wairasian approach that has evolved from Keynes's General
Theory, The rubric "Keynesian" is so br,oad and so vague that
many researchers have applied the term to their theory. If there
is a single theme that unites Keynesian economics, it is the
belief that economic fluctuations reflect not the Pareto—
efficient response of the economy to changes in tastes and
technology, but rather some sort of market failure on a grand
scale.
The market imperfection that recurs most frequently in
Keynesian theories is the failure of wages and prices to adjust
instantly to equilibrate supply and demand. Certainly, the
short—run sluggishness of wages and prices was the key assumption
of the consensus view of the 1960s. And the absence of an
adequate theoretical justification for that assumption was one of
the fatal flaws that undermined the consensus. Here I examine,
roughly in order of historical development, three recent lines of
research that each in its own way emphasizes the failure of
prices to clear markets. Much of this research can be viewed as
attempting to resurrect the consensus view, with some
23modifications, by providing a cogent theoretical foundation of
hard—headed microecoflOmiC reasoning.
Fixed Prices and General Disequilibrium
Beginning with the seminal paper by Robert Barro and
Herschel Grossman (1971), much research in the 1970s used the
tools of general equilibrium theory to examine how markets
interact when prices are fixed at non—market—clearing levels.
This research program was especially popular among European
macroeconomists (Edmond Malinvaud 1977, John Muell.bauer and
Richard Portes 1978, Jean—Pascal Benassy 1982). It showed in the
most rigorous terms how quantities adjust when prices cannot and
how economic policies influence output and employment under fixed
prices.
A significant result of these models is that the behavior of
the economy depends crucially on which markets are experiencing
excess demand and which are experiencing excess supply.
Unemployment——an excess supply of labor——arises in two regimes.
In the first regime, called classical unemployment, firms can
sell all they want in the goods market; unemployment arises
because the real wage is too high for all of the labor force to
be profitably employed. In the second regime, called Keynesian
unemployment, firms are unable to sell all they want at the going
price; unemployment arises because of this quantity—constraint in
the goods market. The difference between these regimes
highlights some important questions that recur in Keynesian
24theorizing. Is the key market imperfection causing high
unemployment in recessions located in the labor market or in the
goods market? If there are imperfections in both markets, how do
they interact? These questions have also received attention
recently from Keynesian theorists pursuing a quite different
research program, and I return to them below.
Because these general disequilibrium models were proposed
prior to breakdown of the prevailing consensus of the 1960s, they
are not directly aimed at remedying the flaws that caused the
breakdown. To concentrate on the implications of fixed prices,
these models beg the question of why prices do not adjust to
clear markets. In the wake of the new classical revolution,
which appears to have had a greater impact on this side of the
Atlantic, American Keynesians were less concerned with the
details of quantity adjustment under fixed prices. They directed
their efforts at modelling the price adjustment process.
Once attention turns to the question of price adjustment, an
incongruity of these general disequilibrium models becomes
apparent. These models impose fixed prices on otherwise
WaLrasian economies. Yet to analyze the question of how prices
adjust, it is necessary to admit that some economic actors have
control over prices. Thus, one needs to go beyond the price—
taking assumption of general equilibrium theory and explicitly
incorporate price—setting agents, such as unions or firms that
enjoy some degree of market power. Once one starts to think
about an economy with price—setters, however, it appears unlikely
25that it will behave like an economy in which pric's are set by a
Walras Ian auctioneer who, for some unspecified reason, fails to
choose equilibrium prices. Therefore, the general disequilibrium
models stemming from Barro and Grossman may not provide the best
framework for addressing even the issues for which they are
designed, such as quantity adjustment under fixed prices. Put
simply, it seems impossible to divorce the issue of quantity
adjustment from the issue of price adjustment.
Labor Contracts and Sticky Wages
Most attempts at explaining why the economy departs from the
Wairasian ideal have centered on the labor market. Keynes
himself emphasized the sluggish behavior of wages. Therefore,
when economists skeptical of the new classical revolution tried
to defend Keynesian economics, the labor market was the natural
place for them to start.
A prominent line of research modeled the labor market as
failing to clear because of labor contracts that specify in
advance the nominal wage at which firms will be able to purchase
labor (Joanna Gray 1976, Fischer 1977, John Taylor 1980). The
primary appeal of these models is that they mirror observed
institutions. Many workers are covered by formal contracts
predetermining a nominal wage, and many others appear to be
covered by informal agreements with employers. Incorporated into
a macroeconomic model, this observation has important
implications for the conduct of monetary policy. One of these
26implications is that the Sargent—Wallace policy—irrelevance
proposition does not hold: if the nominal wage is unable to
respond to economic disturbances, then monetary policy that does
systematically respond to them is a potent tool for stabilizing
the economy, despite the assumption of rational expectations. In
essence,a fixed nominal wage gives the monetary authority
control over the real wage and thus control over employment.
These models based on nominal wage contracts were criticized
on three grounds. First, the existence of such contracts is
never explained from microeconomic principles. If these nominal
wage contracts are responsible for large and inefficient
fluctuations in output and employment, why do workers and firms
write these contracts? There has been much theoretical work
studying optimal risk—sharing arrangements etween firms and
workers. It is clear that optimal contracting cannot produce the
nominal wage stickiness on which these Keynesian contracting
models rely. Because unemployed workers value their leisure less
than the firm values their labor, these contracts leave
substantial and obvious gains from trade unexploited.
Second, despite the existence of labor contracts determining
nominal wages in advance, it is not obvious that these •wages play
an important role in the determination of employment, as these
models assume. Many workers hold lifetime jobs. In the context
of a long—term relationship, a wage paid in any given period need
not equal the marginal product of labor, as it would in a spot
market. Instead, the wage may be like an installment payment.
27For example, some universities pay professors annual salary
equally over nine months, while other universities paythe annual
salary equally over twelve months; yet surely this differencehas
no relation to the work effort or marginal productof the
professors over the course of the year. Similarly, the
observation that some wages are sticky need not imply that the
allocation of labor is determined inefficiently.
Third, the cyclical behavior of the real wage does not
appear consistent with models incorporating a predetermined
nominal wage and movements along a standard, downward—sloping
labor demand schedule. In most of these models, a negative shock
to aggregate demand lowers the price level, raises the real wage
(since the nominal wage is fixed), and thus reduces the quantity
of labor demanded. To the extent that fluctuations are driven by
aggregate demand, real wages should be countercyclical. Yet in
the data, real wages appear to have no consistent relationship
with economic activity, or perhaps appear a bit procyclical. For
example, in the severe 1982 recession, which was allegedly driven
by contractonary monetary policy, real wages were not very
different from what they were a few years earlier or a few years
later. The prediction of countercyclical real wages cannot be
easily reconciled with the evidence.
Economists differ about whether they view these criticisms
as serious. At the very least, these problems with the labor
contracting models placed Keynesians on the defensive in the
academic debate.
28Monopolistic Competition and Sticky Prices
Dissatisfaction with models emphasizing the stickiness of
nominal wages turned the attention of Keynesian macroeconomists
in the 1980s away from the labor market and towards the goods
market. Much effort has been devoted to examining the behavior
of monopolistically competitive firms who face small "menu costs"
when they change prices (Mankiw 1985, George Akerlof and Janet
Yellen 1985, Michael Parkin 1986, Olivier Blanchard and Nobuhiro
Kiyotaki 1987, Julio Rotemberg and Garth Saloner 1987, Laurence
Ball, Mankiw, and David Romer 1989). Taken literally, these menu
costs are the resources required to post new price lists. More
metaphorically and more realistically, these menu costs include
the time taken to inform customers, the customer annoyance caused
by price changes, and the effort required to even think about a
price change.
This line of research is still too new to judge how
substantial its impact will be or to guess what problems will be
judged most serious. What is clear now is that this emphasis on
the goods market can avoid the three problems that plagued the
Keynesian model based on sticky wages alone.
First, these new models can explain in rigorous
microeconomic terms the failure of price—setters to restore
equilibrium. Monopolistically competitive firms do not have much
incentive to cut their prices when the demand for their goods
declines. Yet because of the pre—existing distortion of monopoly
29pricing, the bnefit to the society of a price cut may be large
(first—order) even when the benefit to the firm is small (second—
order).If firms face even a small menu cost, they might
maintain their old prices, despite the substantial. social loss
from this price stickiness.
Second, unlike nominal wages, many of the rigid prices we
observe have a clearly important function in allocating
resources. For example, the prices of magazines at newsstands
often remain unchanged for years at a time (Stephen Cecchetti
1986).It is hard to argue that these prices are merely
installment payments within the context of a long—term
relationship and therefore irrelevant.
Third, these models with menu costs do notimply a
countercyclical real wage. Once price rigidity is introduced as
an important element to explain the response of the economy to
changes in aggregate demand, real wages can be procyclical or
acyclical. Moreover, if price rigidity is combined with the
view that observed wages are merely installment payments, one can
obtain Keyresian results while leaving the path of wages
indeterminate and irrelevant.
For these reasons, the search for nominal rigidities has
shifted from the labor market to the goods market.It would be
incorrect to infer, however, that Keynesians now embrace an
equilibrium labor market. Rather, it is more common to explain
unemployment by various sorts of real rigidities that prevent
real wages from falling to equilibrate the labor market.It is
30only in explaining nominal rigidities and the non—neutrality of
money that emphasis has turned to the goods market.
Of the many sorts of real rigidities in the labor market
that have received attention, the "efficiency wage" models are
probably the most popular (Yellen 1984, Jeremy Bulow and Summers
1986, Katz 1986, Joseph Stiglitz 1986). The common feature of
this class of models is that firms do not reduce wages in the
face of persistent unemployment because to do so would reduce
productivity. Various reasons have been proposed to explain how
wages may affect productivity. A sociological explanation is
that lower—paid workers are less loyal to the firm. An
explanation based on adverse selection is that a lower wage
reduces the average quality of the work force because only the
best workers quit. The most popular explancion of efficiency
wages is "shirking." Since firms monitor effort imperfectly,
workers sometimes shirk their responsibilities and risk getting
fired; a lower wage reduces the cost of getting fired and thus
raises the amount of shirking. In all of these efficiency wage
theories, the impact of wages on productivity diminishes the
incentive for a firm to cut wages in response to an excess supply
of labor.If this productivity effect is sufficiently large, the
normal competitive forces moving the labor market to the
equilibrium of supply and demand are absent.
In an important paper, Laurence Ball and David Romer (1990)
have shown that nominal rigidities caused by menu costs are
enhanced by real rigidities such as efficiency wages. Menu costs
31prevent prices from fallingin response to a reduction in
aggregate demand. Rigidity inreal wages prevents wages from
falling in response to the resulting unemployment.The failure
of wages to fall keeps firms costs high and thus ensuresthat
they have little incentive to cut prices. Hence,although real
wage rigidity alone is little helpin understanding economic
fluctuations because it leads only to classical unemployment and
gives no role to aggregate demand, real wage rigidity together
with menu costs provide a new and powerful explanation for
Keynesian disequilibrium.
CONCLUS ION
I began by suggesting that recent developments in
macroeconomics are akin to the Copernican revolution in
astronomy: immediately they may have little practical value but
ultimately they will point the way to a deeper understanding.
Perhaps the analogy is too optimistic.Copernicus had a vision
not only of what was wrong with the prevailing paradigm, but also
of what a new paradigm would look like.In the past decade,
macroeconomists have taken only the first step in this process;
there remains much disagreement on how to take the second step.
It is undoubtedly easier to criticize the state of the art than
to improve it.
Yet some developments of the past two decades are now widely
accepted. Although some economists still doubt that expectations
are rational, and despite the mixed evidence from surveys of
32expectations, the axiom of rational expectations is as firmly
established in economic methodology as the axioms that firms
maximize profit and households maximize utility. The debateOver
rules versus discretion continues, but time inconsistency is
generally acknowledged to be a problem with discretionary policy.
Most fundamentally, almost all macroeconomistsagree that basing
macroeconomics on firm microeconomic principles should be higher
on the research agenda than it has been in the past.
On the crucial issue of business cycle theory, however,
there appears to be little movement toward a new consensus. The
"new classicals" and the "new Keynesians" each have made
substantial advances within their own paradigms. To explain
economic fluctuations, new classical theorists now emphasize
technological disturbances, intertemporal substitution of
leisure, and real business cycles. New Keynesian theorists now
speak of monopolistic competition, menu costs, and efficiency
wages. More generally, the classicals continue to believe that
the business cycle can be understood within a model of
frictionless markets, while the Keynesians believe that market
failures of various sorts are necessary to explain fluctuations
in the economy.
Recent developments in macroeconomic theory will ultimately
be judged by whether they prove to be useful to applied
macroeconomists. The passage of time will make efficiency wages,
real business cycles, and the other "breakthroughs" of the past
decade less novel. The attention of academic researchers will
33surely turn to other topics.Yet it is likely that some of these
recent developmentswill permanentlY change the way in which
economists of all sorts think aboutand discuss economic behavior
and economic policy. Twenty yearsfrom now we shall know which
of these developments has the powerto survive the initial debate
and to permeate economistS conceptionsof how the world works.
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